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ABSTRACT	
In Europe, residential properties represent a large part of an economy’s overall net 
worth. They constitute important assets and liabilities for both credit institutes and 
private households. As a result, significant changes in residential property prices 
not only exert an influence on developments in the housing market itself, but also 
have noticeable macro-economic consequences. Via their effect on net worth, 
capital costs, balance sheets and the expectations of economic agents, they 
influence private consumption, the private demand for capital goods and the 
stability of the financial markets. 
The present essay is a condensed version of a similarly entitled study that was 
commissioned in 2011 by the Austrian Federation of Limited-Profit Housing 
Associations. The study examines housing market developments in fourteen 
countries of the EU between the years 1995 and 2007 (the start of the crisis in the 
banking, finance and economic sectors), as well as during the time thereafter, up 
until the end of 2011. It focuses on how house prices developed in comparison to 
housing investments during these two periods. In most of the countries, the 
development of the two core housing market indicators was in some respects 
similar, although in others they displayed great deal of divergence. An 
examination will be made of how well the development of these two indicators in 
the individual countries can be explained in terms of the development of incomes, 
interest rates, demographics and other influential factors. One important element 
of this is the description of the changes that took place on the financial markets. 
Further investigation is devoted to taxes, subsidies and other public policies 
related to housing, as well as to transaction costs in the housing markets and 
changes in tenure structure and the housing mix. The conclusion of the present 
essay comprises an attempt to identify the actual stabilising and destabilising 
factors by making a comparison of the countries. On the one hand, this involves 
an analysis of the mispricing that occurred on some of the markets, both at the 
time of the outbreak of the financial crisis and afterwards. On the other hand, an 
analysis is made of the institutional features of three groups of countries, 
classified according to the development of their house prices over the whole 
period of study, up until the end of 2011. 
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HOUSING MARKET CYCLES IN 14 EU COUNTRIES  
A	Historical	Perspective	
Over the course of time, housing markets display a distinctly cyclical pattern of 
behaviour, one that differs considerably from that of other markets. Housing 
construction reacts in a highly sensitive way to macro-economic changes. In many 
countries, housing investments fluctuate considerably more in the course of a 
business cycle than other gross fixed capital formations. Steep rises over several 
years are often followed by drastic slumps within relatively short periods of time. 
An examination of 49 housing construction cycles in 23 countries has shown that, 
on average, within a period of 2 years after a peak, 80% of the growth becomes 
lost once again (Rae and van den Noord, 2006).  
If we imagine for the moment a common housing market involving the fourteen 
EU countries examined here, then we have gone through four housing market 
cycles since 1970. In each of these cycles there was, in at least one year, a 
discernable decline in property prices and/or housing investments. In the mid-
1990s, housing investments (at constant prices) were at approximately the same 
level as 1970. Real house prices were some 25% higher, which corresponds to an 
average (geometric) growth of less than 1% per year. In the mid-90s, the longest 
housing cycle of the last 40 years began. Until well into 2007, prices and housing 
investments grew by an annual rate of 5% and more. In 2007, the first year of the 
financial crisis, a downturn began, which in 2009 led to a decline in real housing 
investments of more than 18%, the biggest slump for many decades. In 2010, as a 
result of the good economic situation, house prices stabilised in most of the 
countries, and the decline in housing investment slowed. However, in 2011, the 
decline set in again even more intensely, and a further decline can be expected in 
2012, because of the weak economy in many countries and as a consequence of 
the Eurocrisis.  
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Figure  1:  Real  house  prices  (Rhp)  and  real  residential  investment  (Rri)  in  EU14  –  A  historical 
perspective  
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Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD, Eurostat, Ameco, and national house price information (see fig. 
2) 
 
A few observations are worth noting with regard to the total period under 
consideration. Firstly, the volatility (i.e. the average annual fluctuation of the rates 
of change) of housing investments is greater than that of house prices. Secondly, 
the connection between house prices and housing investments increased 
considerably. The correlation of the annual rates of change rose from 0.64 in the 
period 1971-1994 to 0.84 in the period 1995-2010. That means that the 
development of house and/or apartment prices acquired increasing significance for 
evaluation of the housing market as a whole.  
This increased significance is directly related to the rising percentage of home-
owners in Europe. In almost all countries, the share of home-ownership among all 
forms of housing increased, on average from 57% in 1980 to 64% in 2009. This 
trend was only interrupted by the continued crisis on the housing market in some 
countries. Many owners of residential property shied away from selling in times 
of falling prices. Houses were rented out, in the hope that prices would soon 
recover. In this way, the number of rented properties increased again. 
Nonetheless, this observation should not lead one to conclude that the trend 
towards a higher percentage of home-owners in Europe has, for the medium-term 
future, come to an end. Some governments continue to promote, at least in the 
long term, an expansion of the home-ownership sector, and many private 
households see the best chance of providing for the future as having a home of 
their own.   
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The third observation to be made on Figure 1 is that, since 2008, the housing 
investment has declined much more steeply than house prices have. This would 
seem to indicate that the economic and political measures that were implemented 
to cushion the economic crisis, in particular those measures relating to fiscal and 
monetary policy, were actually more successful in stabilising house prices than 
investment. In most of the countries examined here, the efforts made to strengthen 
housing investment by means of economic policy were evidently very half-
hearted. 
 
The	Recent	Housing	Market	Cycle	in	the	EU‐14	
Housing market experts are largely in agreement that the last cycle of house prices 
reached its peak in 2007. In most of the EU 14 countries, the increase in house 
prices began in the mid-1990s, in a few countries earlier (Belgium 1986, 
Netherlands 1992), in others somewhat later (Spain 1998, France 1999). The long-
lasting house price boom occurred across a broad spectrum. In eight countries, 
real house prices more than doubled between 1995 and 2007. Only four countries 
did not experience a boom. In Germany, Austria and Portugal, real house prices 
hardly altered at all during this period, while in Italy the increase was moderate in 
comparison with those markets that were booming.  
After 2007, house prices collapsed dramatically in five countries, namely in 
Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Greece and Spain. According to the latest 
reports, the average nominal level of house prices in Ireland in April 2012 was 
already 60% below the highest level from 2007. In Spain, according to the TINSA 
index, the country-wide house prices in April 2012 were around 12.5% of those of 
April 2011. The development in the Netherlands showed a real decrease of 13% 
from its peak in 2007 to the end of 2011, which was not quite so dramatic. 
However, the latest reports show a further massive decline in house prices in the 
1st quarter of 2012 and it is estimated that there will be a decrease this year of a 
real 7% to 8%.  
In contrast, the prices have remained relatively stable in the other boom countries, 
despite the economic crisis. Sweden was even able after 2007, following a brief 
slump in 2008, to point to an increase in real house prices. All in all, the 
development of house prices before and after 2007 prompts an obvious 
categorization of the markets into three groups: boom-bust markets in Ireland, 
Great Britain, Denmark, Greece, Spain (and in the Netherlands); boom-non-bust 
markets in France, Finland, Sweden and Belgium; and non-boom markets in 
Germany, Austria, Portugal and Italy. 
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Figure2: Real house price changes (in %) 
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However it was not only the house prices that rose very steeply between 1995 and 
2007. In some countries there was also a distinct boom in investment. In Spain 
and Ireland the massive investment in housing that had gone on for many years 
led to a bloated building sector. The consequences were a definite loss of 
competitiveness, massive bank crises and a long-lasting economic depression. 
Even today, there is still a considerable surplus of housing in both countries. In 
Spain, it is estimated that there is a stock of more than 1.1 million empty new 
houses, in Ireland the number is more than 100,000.  
There were also big increases in housing investment in Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland. However, particularly in Sweden the starting point of the increases was a 
very low level of housing construction in the mid-1990s. Measured by the share of 
its housing investment in the GDP, Sweden lay well below the U-14 average even 
at the peak of its boom, i.e. despite strong growth. The housing performance was 
similarly weak in Great Britain, which from 1995 to 2009 showed housing 
investment making up an average 3.1% of the GDP, as opposed to a 5.4% average 
in the EU-14. In comparison with other markets with booming house prices, 
housing investment in Great Britain has reacted very weakly.  
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Figure 3: Change in real residential investment (in %) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
The developments in housing investment display two further conspicuous 
features: the slump in housing investment after 2007 shows a marked correlation 
with the previous boom in housing construction and house prices. In fact, one can 
speak of a ‘double bubble’ of housing prices and housing investments in Spain, 
Ireland, Greece and Denmark. Furthermore, it is worth noting that housing 
investments also slumped in those countries in which there was no housing 
surplus during the boom phase. In particular Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Portugal should be mentioned here. Another important aspect of the recent weak 
housing boom in most of the countries is the fact that the low level of housing 
investment has a supportive effect on house prices. 
	
WHICH	FACTORS	WERE	DECISIVE	AND	HOW	HAVE	THEY	CHANGED?		
One important factor that influences housing markets is the set of expectations 
that those people involved have with regard to the development of the economy as 
a whole. These include, in particular, expectations with regard to the development 
of income, unemployment and inflation. However, there are a number of other 
factors that also play a role: 
‐ The monetary and exchange rate policy and its influence on the expectations 
of the future development of interest rates. 
‐ Regulation of the finance market and banking, and the influence of this on 
the credit markets, in particular on credit access. 
‐ Tax policy and its influence on transaction costs and net capital gains. 
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‐ Housing policy in the widest sense, and its influence on the structure and 
reaction of the housing supply; this includes subsidies for housing construction, 
regulation of rents, land policy, urban and regional planning, building regulations 
etc. 
‐ The major protagonists and institutions; which include not only those 
involved more specifically in housing policy, such as private and public property 
developers and limited-profit building associations, but also protagonists in the 
financial and credit markets. 
A further factor is also important for understanding the varied effects of the 
current crisis on the housing markets in the individual countries, namely the 
different market conditions prevailing at the start of the period under examination, 
i.e. the respective stage in the housing market cycle. 
 
The	Housing	Market	Situation	in	the	Mid‐1990s		
The courses of the housing market cycles in the individual countries were not 
synchronous. In the mid-1990s, the housing market in Finland was coming to the 
end of a cycle, whereas the housing markets in Austria and Germany were just 
reaching a peak. At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden had to contend with a 
serious banking crisis, triggered by a collapse in the price of commercial property. 
In the course of the economic slowdown, housing investment also declined 
steeply and since then has remained the lowest in Europe, measured in relation to 
GDP, even though the country has also had the strongest growth rates since the 
mid-1990s. A similar situation can be ascertained in the case of Great Britain, 
which has been fighting supply problems in housing construction for many years.  
There were also differences in the demand for new construction and in the age 
structure of the housing stock. In 1990, the average number of people per 
household varied between 3.4 in Ireland and Spain and 2.1 in Sweden. If one 
assumes approximately similar preferences of the population in relation to 
housing comfort, then there was a considerable backlog demand, above all in the 
southern countries and in Ireland. This factor may have contributed to the 
pronounced housing boom in some of these countries. At any rate, the average 
size of households there decreased more markedly than anywhere else.  
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Figure 4: Age structure of the housing stock – Share of dwellings constructed since 1980; Figures 
from (circa) 2001 
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Source: Housing Statistics in the European Union (2003) 
 
Development	of	Income	and	Interest	Rates	
During the period 1995 to 2007, there was an extremely strong connection 
between house prices and income growth, measured by means of the 
development of the net national income. Taking an average across the countries 
the correlation amounted to +0.76. Ireland stood out on account of its 
remarkable macroeconomic development. The (geometric) growth of the real 
net national income in Ireland was more than 7% p.a., which was easily double 
the average for the fourteen countries.  
In the majority of the countries, the ratio of the average annual growth rates of 
house prices to income amounted to more than 2, i.e. house prices increased 
more than twice as much as income. The difference was greatest between the 
growth of house prices and income in Denmark, France and Belgium. At the 
other end of the scale were Germany, Austria and Portugal, three countries 
with a relatively slow development of real income and, at the same time, 
stagnating or even declining house prices.  
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Figure 5: Real house prices vs. real income – Geometric growth rates from 1995 to 2007, in % 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat data and house price sources (see fig. 2) 
 
Figure 5 shows that, between 1995 and 2007, the average real growth in house 
prices was higher than 6% in a good half of the countries. This is remarkable 
insofar as, according to the European Commission’s new early warning 
mechanism for macro-economic imbalances, exceeding the annual real growth 
in house prices by 6% indicates an internal imbalance and could lead to more 
detailed investigations of the countries concerned (European Commission, 
2012). 
A central common feature of the last housing market cycles in the EU-14 was 
the occurrence of great changes in the financing conditions. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, and in particular in the period before the introduction 
of the Euro, both the nominal and the real interest rates have decreased 
considerably in Europe. On average in the EU-14, the long-term real interest 
rates (yields on government bonds) have fallen from 6% in 1995 to less than 
2% in the years from 2005 to 2007.  
The fall in interest rates was particularly steep in Ireland, where the real 
interest rates lay consistently below 2% after 2000. Entrance into the currency 
union, access to international liquidity, increased competition in the banking 
sector and periodic above-average high inflation all contributed to this. In 
Great Britain, the real interest rate was always above the EU-14 until well into 
2008, although afterwards it lay distinctly below it. The strong growth of house 
prices before 2007 therefore indicates a relatively strong reaction of house 
prices to interest rate changes. The fact that house prices – measured against 
the development of income – have stayed at a high level despite the 
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considerable decreases in recent years, is certainly a consequence of the 
enduring historically low level of nominal and real interest rates, supported by 
a continuing weakness on the supply side in some markets. 
Figure 6: long‐term Real Interest Rates (%) 
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Figure 7: Real house prices vs. Long‐term real interest rates – Av. annual change in % ─ 1995 to 
2007 
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The connection between the average annual changes in interest rates and the 
average annual changes in house prices was in general weak for all the fourteen 
11 
 
countries. However, if we ignore those countries where the house prices were 
stagnating or rising relatively moderately, (Austria, Germany, Portugal and 
Italy), and also Great Britain, which is the country with by far the strongest 
reaction of house prices to interest rate changes, then the result is a very strong 
connection. The house prices rose most steeply in those countries in which 
there was the greatest decline in real interest rates. Nonetheless, one should not 
overlook the fact that countries such as Ireland, Spain, Finland and Sweden had 
also displayed a very steep increase in real income. In these countries, the 
surrounding conditions for the housing demand were in general particularly 
good.  
The effect of interest on developments in the housing markets must always be 
seen in relation to the respective phase of the housing market cycle, as well as 
to income expectations and to the other framework conditions on the finance 
and credit market. On markets with a chronic oversupply of housing or weak 
income expectations, steeply falling interest rates will not trigger a boom in 
housing construction, whereas in markets with housing shortages and steeply 
rising income a fall in interest rates can cause considerable additional impulses. 
Furthermore, the reaction of the house prices and housing investment to 
interest rate changes can also be influenced by means of tax policies, such as 
the possibility of writing off the interest paid for housing expenses within the 
framework of the income tax. In times of credit rationing the nominal interest 
rate acquires increased importance in comparison to that of real interest rate. 
 
Mortgage	Markets	
Up until the beginning of the 1980s, the mortgage markets in Europe were very 
strictly regulated. The right to grant mortgage loans was reserved for 
specialised institutes, above all building and loan associations and similar 
forms of organisations (e.g. the building societies in Great Britain). It was not 
only interest rates that were regulated, but also the loan-to-value ratios and the 
repayment arrangements, as well as the loan maturities. In many countries, 
such a stringent form of regulation led to credit rationing. 
As a result of the deregulation and liberalisation of the last 30 years, 
increasingly easy access to housing loans has become possible for private 
households, caused by a higher number of different providers and a greater 
range of products on offer. The actual amount of credit rationing declined 
considerably, on the one hand due to higher loan-to-value ratios, and on the 
other hand through extended loan maturities. The latter mean that, on a given 
income, private households are faced with lower annuities than was recently 
the case with shorter repayment times, i.e. the affordability of loans increases. 
This combination of higher loan-to-value rates and longer credit periods in the 
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end also made it possible for financially weaker households to gain access to 
loans.  
A second phenomenon, which has emerged in the course of deregulation and 
liberalisation in some countries, is the granting of mortgage-backed credit for 
non-residential consumption (equity withdrawal). In times of steeply rising 
house prices, the lending basis for such credit also rises, which in some 
countries may have contributed to an accumulated growth in consumption. 
Furthermore, in many countries there were regulations which effected a 
reduction of the charges for early loan repayment. In this way, it became more 
cost-effective for borrowers to refinance once more when interest rates were 
falling, i.e. to replace existing loans at higher rates of interest with new ones at 
lower rates of interest. 
A reciprocal relationship exists between changes in house prices and credit 
volumes. Easier access to credit resulting from liberalisation of the credit 
markets, even for households with lower incomes, increased the housing 
demand in many countries and raised prices because there was usually a delay 
in supply. Financing higher house prices on incomes that were rising at a 
comparatively slower rate in turn required more outside capital. This mutually 
escalating process led to higher debt on the part of the households. The process 
was additionally supported by more flexible practices in granting loans, longer 
credit periods and higher loan-to-vale ratios. 
In fact, the debt level of private households has indeed increased tremendously 
in many countries of Europe since the turn of the millennium. The stock of 
outstanding mortgages in the Euro region, for example, has increased from 
27% of the GDP in 1999 to 42% of the GDP in 2007 (ECB, 2009). The 
following Figure 8  shows that house prices have declined since the outbreak of 
the crisis, above all in those countries in which the per capita mortgage debt 
was particularly high. Only Sweden and Greece constitute exceptions here. 
Sweden has not experienced any lasting setbacks in house prices, despite a 
relatively higher per capita debt in 2007. In Greece, house prices have dropped 
considerably, despite a lower per capita debt. One should mention, however, 
that growth of private household debt in Greece was the highest among the 
countries under investigation. 
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Figure 8: Outstanding Mortgage Loans and real House Price Change  
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Along with the steep rise in debt among private households, it could also be 
observed that in some countries there was a notable trend among lenders 
towards the use of more market-based instruments for refinancing loans. At the 
end of 2007, RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) and MCB 
(Mortgage Covered Bonds) comprised 21% of all mortgage refinancing. The 
outstanding amount of true-sale securitisation1 in the Eurozone rose from less 
than 50 bill. Euro in 1997 to more than 750 bill. Euro in 2007. Nevertheless, 
the share of securitisation in all the outstanding housing loans was only 7% in 
the Euro region, compared to c. 50% in the USA. True-sale securitisation had a 
high or greater share of the housing loans in Spain (31%), the Netherlands 
(25%) in Italy and Portugal (respectively about 20%) and in Ireland (10%) 
(ECB, 2009). 
One implication of the increasing use of market-based instruments in 
refinancing the banks was that investors and savers had to bear a greater share 
of the risk, since these forms of investment are not subject to deposit 
protection. Further consequences were that the average loan maturity was 
extended and access to foreign capital facilitated. In particular, this was the 
case in those countries where the credit volume had risen steeply, for example 
in Spain, in the Netherlands and in Portugal. The Spanish Central Bank has 
                                                                
 1True‐sale  securitisation  comprises  the  sale of  a pool of  claims by  an originator  to  a  Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV), which then issues asset‐backed securities, the repayment and interest payments of which 
are tied to the cash flows of the liable assets. If all the risks and claims have been transferred to the SPV, 
they are then derecognised from the originator’s balance sheet.  
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estimated that, at the end of 2007, 66% of all the secured bonds that were 
issued by Spanish finance institutions were in hands of foreign investors. 
Capital market instruments such as Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
(RMBS) facilitate the banks’ management of their exposure to maturity 
mismatches, interest rates and liquidity risks. However, such instruments not 
only have an insurance function, but also involve a high degree of hazard. 
Covered bonds have proved themselves to be a comparatively more stable 
instrument in the crisis, because of the double insurance afforded by the issuer 
and the cover pool, the high-quality collateral, the generally high liquidity, the 
long-term and primarily fixed interest rate issues, standardisation and the fact 
that loans are not removed from the issuers’ balance sheets. 
The European Central Bank summarised the situation as follows (ECB, 2009): 
the causes of the crisis lay in a over-leveraging of the bank’s balance sheets, 
massive recourse to complex and opaquely structured products in several Euro 
countries, and in a broad-based underestimation of risks, which was reflected 
in historically lower credit spreads up to mid-2007. The banks have cut back 
their traditional field of business, namely the granting and servicing of loans 
until maturity, and instead of that concentrated their activities on the 
repackaging and sale of loans to other agents on the financial markets. This 
model has theoretical advantages, such as an improvement of risk allocation, 
wider distribution of the financing basis and enhancements of market 
completeness, yet it also has massive practical disadvantages: it leads to a false 
direction of incentives with a series of principal-agent relationships that are 
difficult to tax, for example between the original lenders and purchasers of the 
new financial instruments. The transfer of the risk, combined with the weak 
powers of control within this system reduces the incentive for the lenders to 
adequately fulfill their traditional responsibility of risk control. An erosion of 
the practice of granting credit leads to the awarding of suboptimal loans with 
higher ex-post risks. Two further disadvantages are the problems of 
information and incentives on the side of rating agencies, which led to the poor 
ex-post performance of the ratings of structured securities, and the maturity and 
liquidity mismatch between the underlying assets (loans) and liabilities 
(securities) that occurs through outsourcing them to a vehicle outside of the 
banks’ balance books.  
 
Taxes,	Subsidies	and	Transaction	Costs	
The housing markets of the EU-14 are distinguished by a variety of 
government interventions. The public sector intervenes directly in the form of 
land-use planning, land policy, public subsidies for housing construction, and 
rent regulation. Indirectly, it attempts to influence the behaviour of market 
participants by means of tax regulations and demand-side subsidies. These 
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fiscal interventions on the part of the state result in various forms of market 
distortion (ECB, 2003). They affect the following: 
 The advantages of investment in property as opposed to other forms of 
investment. 
 The advantage of property ownership as opposed to property renting. 
 The incentive to construct new housing as opposed to investing in the 
maintenance and improvement of already existing housing. 
In relation to the taxation of residential property, it should firstly be criticised 
that the fiscal preference for housing investments as opposed to other types of 
investments, which is particularly widespread in the Netherlands and in 
Denmark, in the form of the tax deductibility of the costs of housing loans, can 
(in the long-term) limit productivity and economic growth (OECD, 2009). 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the stability of the housing markets, it is 
to be expected that the providing of tax incentives for home ownership can 
promote speculative behaviour, because it keeps financing costs down in an 
almost artificial way2. The combination of tax incentives and deregulation of 
the mortgage markets can increase the volatility of the residential property 
prices, in particular if the supply side responsiveness to price changes is weak.  
Figure 9: Tax relief on debt financing costs of home ownership, 2009 
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Source: OECD (2011) 
 
                                                                
2In the Netherlands, for instance, the difference between the market interest rate and the actual financing 
costs, after  tax, which amounted  to more  than 1.6% points  in  the  case of a  representative mortgage 
interest rate of 5.7%, corresponded to a saving of 30% in financing costs. 
16 
 
According to assessments made by Andrews (2010), lowering the extent of tax 
relief on mortgage debt from such a relatively high level as that of Finland to 
the more moderate level prevalent in France would reduce house price rises 
(following a given increase in housing demand) ceteris paribus by 50%. A 
reduction of mortgage interest tax relief would also result in a reduction of 
possibly undesirable distributional effects. According to Matsaganis (2010), 
out of €100 of income tax foregone through mortgage interest deductions, 
between €33 (Sweden) and €57 (Greece) of it went to the richest 20% of 
households. In the Netherlands and Denmark, the contribution of mortgage 
interest tax relief to disposable income in the top income bracket (top quintile) 
is estimated to be 4.3% and 5.4%, respectively. Abolition of the tax 
deductibility of the interest on loans would increase progressive taxation in all 
countries, most noticeably in Greece, Denmark and the Netherlands. Due to the 
regressive distributional effects, precisely young households (first-time home 
buyers) would profit relatively little from this particular tax instrument 
(Andrews and Sanchez, 2011). 
An EU-wide comparison of the extent of state subsidies for housing does not at 
present possess any great significance, due to a lack of good data. Government 
expenditure on housing benefits, for instance, is dealt with in the European 
COFOG99 System under the heading ‘Social Security’, yet is in part also 
included in the category ‘Housing Entities and Community Institutions’, as in 
the case of Austria. This category does not contain loans and reimbursable 
annuity benefits, although these do contain some subsidy elements. These are 
instruments which play an important role in housing grants, particularly in 
Austria. One claim that is more or less certain is that expenditure in this area 
has remained largely stable in most countries over the last 15 years. The 
exceptions include Sweden, Great Britain, France and Ireland. In the last three 
countries, the expenditure, as a percentage of the GDP, has in some cases risen 
considerably, although in Sweden it has clearly decreased. 
The amount of transaction costs paid on the European housing markets 
fluctuates greatly. In 2010, they were highest in Belgium, Italy, Spain and 
France. A study carried out by the European Mortgage Federation, dating from 
2010, shows that – in contrast to an earlier study dating from 2006 – the 
transaction costs in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden and Great 
Britain regressed, only in Germany and Spain did they rise slightly to 4.6% and 
11.4% respectively. Belgium recorded the strongest fall, with a reduction of 
17.1% to 13.4%, although at the highest level. The level of the transaction 
costs influences speculative behaviour. Andrews et al. (2011) come to the 
conclusion that house prices in countries with higher transaction costs tend to 
be less volatile (there are exceptions, see Germany), although the effect seems 
to be minor in comparison with the effects of stricter banking supervision. 
Moreover, the negative effect of higher transaction costs on the mobility of 
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households tends to be negligible, according to the conclusions of Andrews and 
Sanchez (2011). 
 
The	Property	Market	and	Land‐Use	Planning	
The regulation applying to the property market and land-use planning 
measures, in particular, have an influence on the strength of the reaction on the 
supply side of the housing market. The Barker Reviews of 2004 and 2006, for 
example, criticised the British planning system as complex, incalculable and 
slow. In the Netherlands, ever-increasing green belt protection and false 
incentives on the part of local councils are blamed for the weak supply 
reaction. The NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) behaviour of the local councils 
has also been documented in France and in Spain, both of which are accused of 
having long construction phases. Andrews et al. (2011) show that not only the 
temporal reaction but also the quantitative reaction of the supply side to price 
changes tends to be weakest in those countries where there are very long 
construction phases, or where it is particularly time-consuming to obtain 
building permits. Of the countries examined here, those countries that can be 
included in this group are Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium 
and Austria.  
Home	Ownership	Rates	
The percentage of all housing that is self-owned depends on a range of factors. 
These include housing market policies, tax policies, developments on the 
financial and credit markets, income developments, preferences, as well as 
family, household and age structures. Home ownership levels are not only an 
expression of the effects of these factors, but, in their turn, also have 
repercussions: on the one hand, on the operability of housing markets 
themselves, on the other hand, via the level of debt and the generally lower 
mobility of owner households and/or employees in such households, on the 
economy as a whole. Between 1980 and 2009 the average rate of ownership in 
the EU-14 rose by around 7 percentage points (PP) from 57% to 64%. A 
particularly steep rise could be observed in Portugal (+24PP to 2001), the 
Netherlands (+16 PP), Great Britain (+11 PP), France and Italy (+10 PP 
respectively). In Ireland and Sweden, the level of home-ownership has 
decreased slightly since 1980. In Denmark the decrease was more pronounced.  
18 
 
Figure 10: Change in home ownership rates (percentage points) 
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The OECD sees the increasing number of home-owners as a threat to economic 
development, because mobility among home-owners is less than it is for the 
housing sector as a whole. It is presumed that a high degree of mobility among 
the workforce generally improves job allocation on the labour market, and so 
contributes to higher employment, and therefore to a reduction in 
unemployment and to greater economic growth (OECD, 2011). 
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The increased home-ownership rates caused a decline in the percentage of 
rented property in the occupied housing stock. Nevertheless, in some countries, 
the rented property sector still represents the most important part of the housing 
market. It is a sector that has great significance in Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, France, Denmark and Sweden. In Great Britain, the deterioration 
of the rent sector was caused solely by the decline of social rented housing. Its 
share of the occupied housing stock fell from 31% in 1980 to 18%. In Ireland, 
too, and in the Netherlands, there has been a noticeable decline, whereas 
increases have been recorded in Austria, Denmark and Finland. 
The increase in home-ownership rates affected other forms of rented dwellings 
(above all private tenancy) even more than rented council housing. That is 
remarkable insofar as there has been a liberalisation of the rent laws in many 
countries in recent decades. Proponents of liberalisation argue that a freer 
tenancy sector provides greater stimulation for housing investment, giving rise 
to increased supply and so ceteris paribus acts as a brake on the rise in rents. 
Opponents object that market failures predominate on the housing market, 
which tends to put tenants at a disadvantage with the landlords. That creates 
monopolistic advantages for the landlords, in particular the possibility of 
influencing the development of rents in their favour (Arnot, 2003).  
At any rate, liberalisation of the tenancy laws, above all in the 1990s, has not 
itself been able to halt the rise in the levels of home-ownership. However, since 
the 1990s, home- ownership rates have not risen as steeply as they were doing 
in the 1980s. Eventually, as mentioned at the outset, in the course of the 
housing market crisis the percentage of tenancy has risen again in some 
countries, because the drop in house prices meant that house owners preferred 
to rent, and to wait until the house price situation changed back in their favour 
again.  
At present, the problems resulting from the absence of a sufficiently large 
tenancy sector can best be seen in Spain. Given the extreme high 
unemployment, there would be a keen demand for affordable rented housing. 
Many people, above all young households, are unable to finance their own 
homes, due to a lack of income and also on account of the severe credit 
rationing as a consequence of the banking crisis. Theoretically, the large 
number of houses that are standing empty could be converted into rented 
housing, unfortunately however, the majority of these buildings are not located 
in places with of highest demand. The example of Spain clearly shows how 
important it is to have a sufficient stock of tenant housing for a generally well-
functioning housing market. It is a market which, both from a welfare 
economics point of view and for social reasons, has to work satisfactorily, 
particularly in difficult economic times. 
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INDICATORS	OF	STABILITY	AND	INSTABILITY	
Developments on the European housing markets since the mid-1990s were 
influenced both by global factors (financial market liberalisation, European 
integration) as well as by country-specific factors (macro-economic 
development, housing policies, institutional framework). Two indicators of 
instabilities on housing markets, which are frequently employed, are the 
volatility of house prices and of investments in housing construction. Strong 
fluctuations of housing prices lead to planning uncertainties on the markets and 
can also contribute to macro-economic instability, with corresponding negative 
effects on the overall welfare of society. A high degree of volatility in housing 
investment is also undesirable, because it increases fluctuations in economic 
activity. The central problem is that, in times of massive changes in demand, 
the volatility of housing prices can only be kept low by means of a 
correspondingly strong supply reaction, i.e. high flexibility and therefore also 
volatility in housing investment. That applies to a sudden increase in demand 
as well as to a sudden collapse of demand. What we have here is therefore a 
trade-off between house price volatility and housing investment volatility. 
Most of the housing market experts evidently regard strong fluctuations in 
housing prices as more detrimental, and advocate a supply side that is as 
flexible as possible (recently OECD, 2011).  
House	Prices	and	Fundamental	Factors	
Figure 19 shows that the differences between the average growth in housing 
prices and the growth rates of income, rents and population were at their 
highest in Great Britain, Finland, Denmark and Sweden up until 2007 
(recognisable by the low ranking number for the correlation of housing prices 
with the growth of demand factors). That entails that the development of 
housing prices in these countries up to the outbreak of the financial crisis could 
only be relatively poorly explained by real demand factors.  
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Figure 12: House Prices relative to Impact Factors–1995 to 2007 
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On the other hand, the gap between the growth of the housing prices and the 
rates of change in interest rates and new loans for house purchase was lowest in 
Sweden, Greece, the Netherlands and Great Britain. In these countries, house 
prices have reacted most strongly to changes in the monetary indicators. It is 
worth noting that neither Ireland nor Spain emerge as extreme examples here.  
To a certain extent, the growth of house prices can only be poorly explained by 
taking into account the monetary developments. For example, this applies in 
particular to Great Britain, Finland und France. The rest of the explanation 
must therefore be found on the supply side. Figure 13 shows that, up until 
2007, these three countries, and above and beyond them also Denmark and the 
Netherlands, had the greatest gap between house price growth and the growth 
and level of housing investment (average ratio of housing investments to 
GDP). In these countries, the supply side reacted most sluggishly to price 
developments in a country-by-country comparison. 
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Figure 13: House Price Development And Supply Side Response─ 1995 to 2007 
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House	Price	Volatility,	State	Influence	and	Institutions	
The effects of macro-economic developments on the central housing market 
indicators, namely house prices and housing investments, depend most 
decisively on the country-specific design of the system of financing housing 
and the numerous different facets of national housing policies. In order to 
identify which country-specific factors tend to be stabilising and which tend to 
have a more destabilising effect, an attempt has been made to rank the 
countries with regard to the markedness of the factors in order of priority. The 
factors that were examined derive from the fields of the finance market, taxes, 
transaction costs and direct state influence on the housing markets, and the 
fourteen countries were correspondingly divided up into three groups 
according to the development of their house prices up to 2007 and thereafter: 
 boom-bust countries: Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Denmark, Greece, 
(Netherlands) 
 boom-nonbust countries: France, Sweden, Belgium, Finland 
 nonboom countries: Austria, Germany, Italy, (Portugal).  
The qualitative rankings are summarised in Tables 1 and 2.  One plus (+) 
signifies that, in relation to the relevant indicators, the respective country had a 
pre-eminent position or a higher ranking. Three pluses (+++) accordingly 
signify the highest ranking or the most marked manifestation. Conversely, 
three minuses (---) show that a country was a straggler in relation to the 
relevant factor or had the least marked manifestation.  
23 
 
Characterisation of the countries and groups of countries on the basis of the 
financial market indicators leads to the following conclusions: the boom-bust 
countries present a largely homogenous picture. In relation to the liberalisation 
of the financial markets, they were the most advanced in 1995 and – according 
to the mortgage market index of 2008 – had largely complete mortgage 
markets. The share of the new capital market instruments (securitisation, 
mortgage-backed securities) in refinancing mortgages was relatively high, 
likewise the share of mortgages with variable interest rates. The degree of debt 
of private households and the growth of mortgages for house purchases were 
very high. On average, mortgages in the boom-bust countries show the longest 
credit periods in a country-to-country comparison.  
The boom-nonbust countries, on the other hand, present a very heterogeneous 
picture. France and Sweden, for instance, were pioneers of the liberalisation of 
the financial market, whereas Belgium and Finland were among the stragglers. 
The main differences to the boom-bust countries appear to lie in the use of the 
new capital market instruments to refinance housing construction loans, as well 
as in the share of the loans with variable interest rates and in the level of the 
household debt.  
The non-boom countries, on the other hand, present a rather more homogenous 
picture, which is in stark contrast to the boom-bust countries. They were 
sluggish in liberalising their financial markets and in integrating the mortgage 
markets, and the loan-to-value ratios for loans and the degree of household 
debt were comparatively low. 
In comparison with the financial market indicators, characterisation on the 
basis of broad housing market indicators leads to a generally more obscure 
picture. There are only a few salient facts: firstly, in the boom-bust countries, 
with the exception of Denmark, there are very high home-ownership rates and 
comparatively liberal systems of rent regulation. Secondly, all the boom-
nonbust countries show a high percentage of public housing. Thirdly, all the 
non-boom countries had a high rate of taxation on proceeds from the sale of 
property, and restrictive regulations for deducting mortgage costs from income 
tax. All in all, the stabilising or destabilising effects of the individual fields of 
the national housing market policies can be less easily identified than is the 
case in the field of financial market indicators. In part, this lies in the lower 
quality or comparability of the data, for instance in the area of state subsidies 
for housing. The national housing market policies display a variety of different 
aspects, and cannot be successfully reduced to simple distinguishing factors, so 
that a convincing statement is at present still lacking. 
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Table 1: A Characterisation based on Financial Market Indicators 
Financial 
Reform 
Index 1995 
(Abiad at al. 
2008)
Mortgage 
Market 
'Completeness' 
2008 (IMF, 2008)
Mortgage 
Backed 
Securities / 
Outstanding 
Mortgage 
Loans ─ Av. 
2003 to 2006 
(EMF-Hypostat, 
2004, 2005, 
2006,2007)
Share of 
Variable 
Rate 
Loans 
(ECB, 2003)
Typical 
Loan-to-
Value (LTV) 
Ratio (ECB, 
2003 a. o.)
Level of 
Household 
Debt 
(Eurostat)
Growth of New 
Loans for 
House 
Purchase 
(ECB, 2009)
Typcial 
Loan 
Maturity 
(ECB, 2003 a. 
2009; a.o.)
Boom-Bust markets
Denmark + + + + + + ─ ─ ─ + + + + + ─ 30
Greece n. o + + + + + o ─ ─ + + + 15-20
Ireland + + + + + + + + + + ─ ─ + + + + + 31-35
Spain + + + + + + + + + ─ ─ + + 30
United Kingdom + + + + + + + + + + + o + + o 25
As a group + + + + + + + + + + + ─ + + + + 27
Netherlands + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 30
Boom-NonBust markets
Belgium o o o ─ ─ ─ + + ─ o 20
Finland ─ + + o + + + o o o 20-25
France + + + ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ o o o 19
Sweden + + + + + + ─ ─ o + + + + + + 25
As a group + + ─ ─ + o + 22
NonBoom markets
Austria ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ o ─ ─ ─ ─ o 25
Germany o ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 25
Italy ─ ─ ─ + + ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ + 15
As a group ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 22
Portugal n. n. + + + + + + n. + + o n.  
Sources:  Author’s  calculations  based  on  data  from  Abiad  et  al.  (2008),  IMF  (2008),  ECB  (2003),  ECB 
(2009), Hypostat (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007), Eurostat, and Government of Ireland. 
Table 2: A Characterisation based on broad Housing Policy Indicators 
Capital Gains 
Taxes (author's 
calc. based on 
nat. information)
Value of 
Mortgage 
Interest Tax 
Relief (OECD, 
2011)
Transaction 
Costs of 
Purchasing 
Property 
(EMF, 2010)
Rent 
Regulation 
Index (author's 
calc. based on 
nat. information; 
results broadly in 
line with OECD, 
2011)
State 
Subsidies for 
Housing 
(Eurostat)
Share of 
Social 
Housing in 
Total Stock 
(Housing 
Statistics in the 
European Union, 
2011)
Home 
Owners 
Quote (Housing 
Statistics in the 
European Union, 
2011)
Boom-Bust markets
Denmark + + + + + + ─ ─ ─ o o + + ─ ─ ─
Greece o + + + + + + ─ ─ ─ n. ─ ─ ─ + +
Ireland o o ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ + + + o + + +
Spain ─ + + + ─ + + + ─ ─ ─ + + +
United Kingdom ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ o + + +
As a group o + + ─ ─ ─ + + ─ + +
Netherlands ─ ─ ─ + + + ─ ─ + + + + + o
Boom-NonBust markets
Belgium ─ ─ + o ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ o +
Finland + + + o ─ ─ ─ + o
France ─ ─ o + + + ─ + + + + ─
Sweden + + + + ─ ─ + + + + + + + ─ ─
As a group ─ + + ─ o + + ─
NonBoom markets
Austria + + + ─ ─ o ─ o + + + ─ ─
Germany + + + ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ + + ─ ─ ─ ─
Italy + + ─ ─ + + + + + + ─ ─ + +
As a group + + + ─ ─ + + + o ─
Portugal + ─ + + + + n. ─ ─ + + +  
Sources: Author’s  calculations based on data  from EMF  (2010),OECD  (2011), Housing Statistics  in  the 
European Union (2010), Eurostat, and national information. 
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CONCLUSIONS	
Firstly, although the liberalisation of the financial markets does not represent a 
sufficient condition for a crisis on the housing markets, it does indeed 
constitute a necessary one. All of the countries with a boom-bust cycle of real 
house prices examined here had largely liberalised financial markets as of the 
middle of the 1990s. On the other hand, there were countries with advanced 
liberalisation in which real house prices had not fallen, or had fallen only 
slightly, since the outbreak of the crisis. The question of stability or instability 
of housing markets does not, therefore, depend primarily on formal 
liberalisation of the financial markets, but rather on the institutional 
implementation of this process, as well as on other circumstances and, of 
course, on the behaviour of the agents.  
Secondly, an important role is played by the general orientation of the system 
of financing housing construction and the predominant way in which housing 
loans are refinanced by lenders. Markets with a tradition of long-term 
financing, in which fixed interest loans are the rule, develop in a more stable 
way, due to the fact that such loan contracts are easier to service and control, 
and involve a more stable relationship between customers and banks. 
Systematic short-term financing of durable commodities does not make 
economic sense, at least in the long run. More flexibility on the side of the 
recipients of loans requires, in turn, more flexibility on the side of the lenders. 
That inevitably leads to what are, in effect, short-term planning horizons for the 
lenders, i.e. short-term refinancing and correspondingly higher risks. Capital 
market instruments such as mortgage backed securities (MBS) do indeed make 
it more feasible to have better management of the exposure of the banks in 
relation to maturity mismatch, interest and liquidity risk. However, such 
instruments do not only have an insurance function, but also involve high risks. 
During the crisis, covered bonds proved to be comparatively more stable 
instruments, due to the double coverage afforded by the issuer and coverage 
funds, high-quality collateral, generally high liquidity, long-term and 
predominantly fixed-interest issuance, standardization, and the fact that loans 
are not derecogniced from the issuer’s balance books. 
Thirdly, an eye has to be kept on the balance sheets and the distribution of debt 
of private households. A higher level of private debt was – and still is – an 
essential factor in the present crisis. With the exception of Sweden, all the 
countries with a high level of debt in private households have experienced a 
massive collapse in house prices. However, even Sweden has to fear that 
further shocks in the European finance system could lead to turbulence on its 
housing and finance markets, since at the present time a large part of the 
refinancing of housing credit (mortgages) lies in foreign hands. 
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Fourthly, in view of the experience of the crisis, the widespread strong demand 
for home-ownership has to be seen from a critical perspective. For a stable 
development of the housing markets, a critical mass of rental housing is 
needed. A sufficiently large rental sector has a stabilising effect on housing 
prices and thereby also affects the economic situation as a whole. Precisely in 
times of crisis, or in times of loan rationing by the banks, an adequate supply of 
rental housing forms the precondition for young families, in particular, to be 
able to set up a household. In addition, a functioning rent sector increases 
mobility of the households, which has a positive effect on the allocation to the 
labour market and on the growth of the economy. In this connection, the social 
rent sector plays an extremely important role, since as a rule it helps rent 
development to remain stable.  
Fifthly, we should think of global influencing factors and country-specific 
factors separately. From a global perspective, it is above all the changes that 
have taken place on the financial markets that have had significant effects on 
the housing markets over the last two to three decades. All the housing markets 
under consideration have been affected by this, even if to varying degrees. 
Surprisingly, the examination shows that the development of housing prices in 
Ireland and Spain can be better explained by the changes in the fundamental 
influencing factors of population, income, interest rates, loans and housing 
investments than in some of the other countries. In both these countries there 
were significant maldevelopments, and the housing construction sector was 
overall too large. However, it has not been possible to sufficiently explain the 
dramatic collapses during the crisis by means of country-specific factors alone. 
This suggests that there must also have been detrimental impacts deriving from 
the financial sector, resulting in a more dramatic effect on the housing markets 
than in the other twelve countries.   
Sixthly, in some countries can be seen massive weaknesses on the supply side 
of the market. The countries to be mentioned here are Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Finland, France and Sweden. The causes of this are to some 
extent well-known. For instance, the strong protection of nature and the green 
belts in Great Britain and in the Netherlands has already been mentioned. In 
France, Finland and Sweden, the weaknesses on the supply side are 
concentrated in the urban regions, whereas in the rural areas a surplus is 
increasingly predominant. In part, this was caused by a subsidy system and its 
false promises, particularly in France. Moreover, in France there are 
complaints about processes for obtaining building permission, NIMBY policies 
on the part of local councils and high technical standards, which considerably 
increase the building costs. High construction costs also constitute a latent 
problem in Sweden and in Austria. 
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Seventhly, in Austria, as also in Germany, Portugal and Italy, the prices of self-
owned houses and apartments and of housing investments, changed little up 
until the middle of the last decade. However, in Austria, we can observe that 
freehold prices have been continually rising above the inflation rate for several 
years, against the European trend. The reasons for this are presumably to be 
found, on the one hand, in an increased orientation of the demand towards the 
ownership sector, and on the other hand, in a sense of uncertainty among 
investors, who see property investment as a way of protecting themselves 
against the Euro crisis. Reassuring is the fact that price increases have so far 
not been connected to any great increase in the debt of private households, as 
was the case in other countries before the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
2007. According to the data of the ECB, the growth rates of loans for home 
purchases is distinctly below the growth rates of the years between 2004 and 
2007, and very far indeed from the growth rates in Ireland and Spain before the 
financial crisis. In addition, according to the latest reports of the Austrian 
National Bank, the share of foreign currency loans in the total stock of loans 
given by Austrian banks to Austrian private households has decreased 
considerably. However, the current cuts in government housing subsidies will 
lead to relatively low rates of housing construction over the next few years, 
above all in the field of social housing. In the face of continued strong growth 
of the population, above all in the east of Austria, this could also result in 
another steep increase in rents. Such a development would furthermore have 
negative consequences with regard to inflation, economic growth and social 
solidarity. 
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